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U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, AS IT RELATES TO 
THE GENEVA AND S. E. A. T. 0. AGREEMENTS 
Bobby Shepherd 
May 6, 1971 Honors, special studies. 
Few chapters of American history have been filled with 
more importance and had more impact upon this nation polit-
ically, socially and morally than has the era of active · ·; 
involvement in the land war in vietnam, during the mid 1960•s. 
" . "" . . 
The war has taken almost ffi=O, 000 Am.eri can lives, has contri-
buted directly to the political end of one American president 
and has plunged the united states into an ordeal of re-exam-
ination and interna.l turmoil rarely seen in u. s. history. 
As great as the impact of this war has been, it is 
remarkable that little is recalled by American citizens or 
acknowledged by the government, of its roots in the mid 1950•s. 
Little is remembered of the great conferences of 1954-55, 
which sought to bring some peace and political order to south-
east Asia. Rarely has the United states government presented 
a factual comparison of our massive involvement in south 
vietnam and the two legal documents which have done most to 
shape southeast Asia in the last twenty years •· 
This paper will examine these two documents, The 1954 
Geneva Accords and the southeast Asia collective Defense 
Treaty, commonly referred to as the s. E. A. T. o. Treaty, 
as they relate to American policy in Vietnam. Although this 
paper will center on these two documents, it will deal in a 
less extensive manner with other events, documents and "com-
mitments", which necessarily are intertwined with the two doc-
uments already mentioned. 
This paper is concerned with the legality not the mor-
ality of the involvement of the united states in vietnam and 
it is concerned with those events which have a bearing on its 
legality as it is related to the two documents. 
Before considering the basic subjects of this paper, It 
is necessary to review br.iefly the events in. post world war 
II Vietnamese history which would form the basis for the con-
flict still being waged today. 
The situation as world war II ended in southeast Asia, 
as concerns Vietnam was this. The Japanese forces which had 
ousted the French colonial authorities, had been defeated. 
The Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh or Viet Minh,led by Ho Chi Minh 
had been set up to combat, 11French and Japanese Fascism. 111 
Basically the Viet Minh was a nationalistic group, it was 
however, led and controlled by communist elements. The 
group fought against the Japanese, during the war, probably 
in an effort to free their own country more than to aid the 
allies. The French forces left in Vietnam were only the dis-
armed remnants of the :pre-world war IT colonial force. They 
were unable to resume control of vietnam. At potsdam, in 
JUly, 1945, the American, British and soviet leaders made 
plans to divide Vietnam at the sixtee~th parallel. British 
lnraper, Theodore, Abuse of power, The Viking press, 
New york, 1967 1 p. 18. 
2 
forces were to occupy the southern sector whil.e Chinese 
forces under Chiang Kai-s.hek were to occupy the North. 
The objective of these two armies were to evacuate all pri-
sonars of war left in Vietnam and to disarm and capture 
all remaining Japanese soldiers in that country. N~ arrange-
ments were made for the restoration of French authority 
in Vietnam. president ·Roosevelt, in the Malta and yalta 
talks, had expressed his belief in the desirability of a 
trusteeship for Indo China, and his opposition to a res-
toration of French colonialism in that area. 2 
The British and Indian troops in the south .. : a:r~a., .. at \"~the 
order of their commander, General Gracey, disarmed the Viet 
Minh forces in their zone, in violation of his orders. His 
forces re-armed the French soldiers of that zone and allowed 
them to carry out a coup dtetat against the Viet Minh gov-
ernment. open warfare between the nationalistic Viet Minh 
and the British and French forces began. When the British 
pulled out, 50,000 French troops remained in the southern 
sector of Vietnam. 3 
In the No_rthern re·gion, Chinese forces were hostile to 
both the viet Minh and the French. They dealt with the pop-
~oreign ~elations of the United states, Diplo~atic 
papers, The Conferences at Malta and yalta, 1945, p. 770. 
3McT'!lrnan, George and · Lewisl Joh:n 1ft!., The united states;· 
in Vietnam, Delta printing, 1967, p. 30. 
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ulation as severely as had the Japanese. The Chinese indi-
cated an unwillingness to leave the country after their · 
assignment was completed. As a result the Viet Minh had to 
choose between the Chinese and the French or fight both. 
Their hostility towards China proved the greater. 
on M·arch 6, 1946, the French agreed to recognize Ho 
Chi Minh's, 11Democratic Republic of Vietnam, '' as a free 
state, forming part of the Indo Chinese Federation and the 
French union. The French agreed to grant that state inde-
pendence in five years. The agreement collapsed in months, 
as France, with u. s. weapons, sought to regain its position 
of power. A clash between the Viet Minh and prench units 
at Haiphong on November 20, 1946, began a series of inci-
dents which resulted in full scale combat in necember of ' · ·" 
that year. 
The United states was, at first, hesitant in backing 
the French colonial effort. The fall of Ch:!.na to the com-
munists in 1949, however, caused the Truman administration 
to lean towards the French. u. s. aid to them. increased. 
In February of 1950, the u. s. extended formal diplomatic 
recognition to the Bao Dai puppet regime in Vietnam. soon 
aid to the French became associated with intervention in 
Korea and the Formosa straits in a policy of containment 
4 
towards China. 4 The French soon were regarded as battle:lmg 
communist invasion rather than suppressing a patriotic or 
nationalistic movement. BY 1952, the u. s. was providing 1/3 
to 1/2 of the cost of the French war effort. 5 In JUly, 1953, 
France promised to grant independence to Vietnam. Thus giving 
the u. s. and secretary of state Johh poster Dulles a ba.sis 
for increasing its support. 
In spite of u. s. aid, the French position deteriorated. 
At the battle of Dien Bien Phu, a major French force faced 
defeat. French Chief of staff paul Ely, informed president 
Eisenhower on March 20, 1954, that only massive u. s. inter-
vention could stave off a French defeat. over the advice of 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, Admiral Radford, Vice 
president Nixon and secretary of state Dulles, Eisenhower . ! 
6 
refused to .: act. Dien Bien phu fell. 
Facing military defeat abroad and domestic crisis at 
home, the French sought a solution which would allow them to 
save face. The Geneva Conference provided such an exit. 
The Geneva conference was planned by American, Russian, 
British and French foreign ministers. Cambodia, The Viet Min~ ! 
4ibid.' p. 31. 
5 op cit., nraper, Abuse of power, p. 26. 
~cTurnam and Lewis, The united states in Vietnam, 
p. 39. 
5 
Democratic ~epublic of Vietnam, Bao Daits state of Vietnam, 
taos and communist China, also took part. It was held from 
April 26, to July 21, 1954. Both the French and the Viet 
Minh seemed eager to make a settlement. The newly elected 
prime Minister of France, pierre Mendes France, was eager to 
extricate French forces from the battlefields. The Viet Minh, 
led by Ho Chi Minh, possibly pressured by Russia and com-
munist China and eager to avoid further casualties, also 
seemed willing to compromise. With a battlefield advantage, 
The Viet Minh were in a favorable position. Both sides made 
considerable concessions. 
The u. s.ts attitude towards the conference was ambi-
guous. With congressional elections near, Eisenhower didn't 
want to be charged with losing Indo China in an unfavorable 
7 
settlement or with blocking peace hopes. The attitude of 
our government seemed to be one of watch and wait. And, 
disassociating himself from the conference, Dulles left 
under secretary of state Bedell smith to represent the u. s. 
The results of the conference were expressed in two 
documents; the bilateral Agreement on the cessation of Host-
ilities in vietnam and the multi-lateral Final Declaration. 
These two documents will be explored, as u. s. policy towards 
Vietnam is considered in their relationship to them. 
7/ ~., p. 44. 
6 
The bilateral treaty included the following provisions; 
a provisional military demarcation line (fixed at the 17th 
parallel), "on either side of which the forces of the two 
parties shall be regrouped after their withdrawal,a viet 
Minh to the North, French union Forces to the south. A max-
imum regrouping period of 300 days. Civil administration 
was to be handled by the controlling forces in each zone. 
General elections were to be held in the summer of 1956. 
The treaty banned additional troop ,reinforcements, arms 
or the establishment of new military bases. An international 
commission (canada, India and poland) was established to 
8 supervise the execution of the agreements. 
It is important to point out at this time, that the div-
ision of vietnam was only provisional and not in any way 
meant to signify the permanent establishment of two sap-
erate states. Vietnam was still one nation, one half under 
the jurisdiction of the French, the other under the Viet Minh. 
The Final Declaration of the convention was agreed to 
by all the nations present except the representatives of the 
united states and the delegates of the Bao nai, state of 
Vietnam. This declar~tion endorsed the armistice agreement; 
made arrangements for detailed political and administrative 
processes; re-enforced the temporary nature of the provis-
ional division line and took notice of the JUly, 1956 date 
8cmd. 9239, Miscellaneous :No. 20 (1954), Her Majestyts 
stationery Office, London, 1954. 
7 
for general .elections. 
Although the united states refused to officially 
endors'e this Final Declaration, a statement was maae which 
implied its reluctant intention to . abide by its provisions. 
In regard to the accords, the u. s. would, "refrain from the 
·, 
threat or the use of force to disturb them," further it, 
"would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of 
the af6resaid agreements with grave concern, and as ser-
iously threatening international peace and security. 119 
A similar pledge was made by state of v~etnam FOreign 
Minister Tran van Do on July 21, 1954. 10 
It is useful, at this point, to quote one provision of 
the Bilateral treaty which was endorsed by the Final Dec-
laration; and a provision of that Final Declaration: 
"4. The signatories of the present agree-
merit and their successors ·in their 
func'tion shall be responsible for the 
observance and enforcement of the terms 
and provisions thereof.nll 
"The conference takes note of the . clauses . 
in the agreement ori the cessation of hos-
tilities in vietnam to the effect that no 
military base under the control of a for-
eign state may be established in the re-
grouping zones of the two parties, the lat-
ter having the obligation to see that the 
zones allotted to them shall not consti-
tute part of any military alliance and shall 
9McTurnan and Lewis, The united states in Vietnam. 
p. 51. 
1
°Fifeld, nussell H., The Diplomacy of southeast Asia, 
Harper and Brothers, New york, !959., p. 296. 
ilop cit., cmd. 9239, Miscellaneous No. 20 
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not be utilized for the resurri.ption of 
hostilitier. or in the service of an 
aggressive . policy."l2 
The latter provision was taken by Ho Chi Minh, as insurance 
that elections would come about regardless of how the 
French fared in the south. rt was probably included as 
a compromise ~easure in exchange for the viet Minhts appro-
val of a temporary partition at the 17th parallel. With 
the out . right support of the soviet union and Great Britain 
along with the tacit approval of the united states, the viet 
Minh were reasonably confident that the terms of the agre-
ement would be adhered to. 
When the desperate condition of the French armies in 
Vietnam in 1954 is considered, it is remarkable that the 
French and her allies left Geneva with as much as they did. 
In fact, l. bO;th Dulles and president Eisenhower felt that the 
results of the conference were not as bad as had been expected. 
However, Dulles still regarded with horror any agreement 
which yielded to a communist oriented regime. 13 
After setting the stage, and considering briefly the 
provisions of the Geneva agreements, we can now look at 
u. s. policy towards vietnam in the light of those pro-
visions. 
I feel it is safe to .laS s tUTie 1 that however distaste-
13nraper, Abuse of p-ower,, p. 35. 
9 
ful, they had indicated by .their statements at Geneva 
and by their lack of active participation in the talks 
themselves, that they would not seek to interfere with 
their execution. The accords seem ba~ically to be the 
resolution of a state of conflict between the French and 
the Viet l\finhts Democratic Republic of vietnam, which had, 
at one time, received recogniti.on from France. Thus a 
legal basis for peace in Vietnam had been set-up. 
A discussion of . forth coming American, actions toward 
vietnam and the Geneva accords must begin with an .under-
standing of the attitude of the American leaders toward the 
Vietnam question. secretary of state Dulles stated, dur ing 
the conference, ffAmerican public opinion would never tolerate 
the quaranteeing of the subjection of millions of vietnamese 
to communist rule.ul4 This statement was typical of the 
attitude of many in the administration. The viet Minh were 
. . . ... 
regarded as a part of the rnt~rnational Cimmunist movement. 
This was a period when the "domino theory," was much in 
vogue. According to this theor3 the fall of vietnam to 
the communists would cause the rest of Indo China to fall, 
then Indonesia and Malaya, fol1<:>wed by the rest of Asia and 
the pacific. This was the era of "brinksmanship,n of con-
frontation between East and west, the Free and the communist 
14~rcTurnan and Lewis, The uni ted states in Vietnam, Po 60. 
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world. Korea, Formosa and Greece were examples of this. The 
American government was, evidentl~, set on continuing this 
pattern in Vietnam and Indo China. 
After the Geneva conference~ the united states began a 
policy, towards Vietnam,which violated the intent if not the 
letter of those accords. 
This violation took form, principally, in the disregard-
ing, by the united states' of the tempora~ status of the 
17th parallel provis-ional demarcation line. The united s.tates 
began treating the southern zone, The state of Vietnam, as a 
separate and sovereign nation. 
. -
More than a year before Geneva, the United states had 
developed a plan for an alliance of free southeast Asian 
states. The primary purr>ose of this a~liance would be to .· 
halt the communist advance in the area. The plan had been 
impossible to instigate before Geneva. The Asian nations 
were, as a group, hesitant to join in any alli~~ce with France, 
while a colonial war was in progress in vietnam. 
The end of ijostilities in Vietnam, opened the way for 
such an alliance. The southeast Asia collective Defence 
Treaty, or s. E. A· T. o. pact, was signed on september 8, 
1954, at Manila. The treaty and its implications will be 
discussed in more detail later. The signing nations were, 
The u. s., Great Britain, France, Australia, New zealand, 
The philippines, pakistan, and Thailand. Included in the 
protocol of that Treaty, but not actually signin~was 
11 
cambodia, Laos and the, ''free . t~rritory und~r the juris-
diction of the state of vietnam. ttl5 The s·outhern zone of 
Vietnam had entered . into an alliance, if not technically, 
in tact and purpose. This was a violation of the Bilat-
eral treaty and of the Final neclaration, which states, 
" ••• (the . zones) .sha~l :t;lOt . canst~ tu~e part. of an~ m~li tary 
alliance ••• " The s. E. A. T. o. treaty was certainly a 
military alliance. The treaty violated the Geneva accords 
in spirit, it implied that the 17th parallel l1ad a political 
character and i·t i.gnored the neutrality of the southern 
zone. It signalled the u. s.•s intent to underwrite a 
separate state in southern vietnam. 16 The s. E. A. T· Q. 
pact seems to be part of the United states answer to the 
domino theory. That answer being to draw the line at the 
17th parallel in order to prevent further communist expan-
sion. Dulles said, after Geneva, that handing over half 
. . . . 
of Vietnam to the communists had, 19 eliminated the possiib-
ility of a domino effect in southeast Asia," by, " saving" 
. . . . " . 
the other half, Laos and cambodia.l?t There are indications, 
151bid., p • . 62. 
16~., p. 63. 
17nraper, Abuse of power, p. 36. 
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in fact, that s. E. A· T. o. was a~med prim~rily at defend-
ing Indo . China against further communi~t advance, more 
than to protect the other Asian states. 18 These facts 
raise the questipn of whether the u. s. e~er inte~ddd 
to allow the re-unification to take place. This is 
.re-enforced by the anti-subversion provision of the trea t y 
aimed specifically . towards Vietnam and Indo China. 
As s. E. A· T. o. indicated a permanent status for 
the demarcation line, so did u. s. policy indicate its 
recognition af a sovereign state of Vietnam in the southern 
' . . . . ) ~ 
zone. originally, after the cease fire, u. s. aid to Vl·etpam 
was .directed through the French union forces there, and not 
to the vietnamese themselves. Gradually as French author-
-- . . . .. . . , , 
ities withdrew during the two year regro~pment period, 
the united states took its place and attempted to build 
up a southern state. 
on July J 71 ~ 19.54, Ngo Dinh Diem formed a government 
in the southern zone. The Chief of state, Bao nai, made 
Diem premier, giving him full goverrnnental power. The two 
leaders came to odds, with Diem finally triumphing. A 
referendum held on october 23, 1955, favored the depos-
ition of Bao nai and his replacement by Diem, the major-
... ~, l.- \. · -~ ,.._:::.- : ·· '.';: .• ~}. ~- ' _;~:. · _•: . 
lBNew york Times, New york, January 22, 1955, 
p.l. 
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ity was a highly questionable 98.2~.19 rn ltisulrlg struggles 
for power, the u. s. refused to support any governm_e11t but 
- . . 
Diem•s. BY early 1955, the u. s. was playin~ the major 
role in training and reorganizing the National Army. Tli:ts 
9.-gi:l.'iri·: a p;J)ears·' Jto I J:·KaV.e~ lJe'eh·; an:· ffift€hnpt''· tO· Olild .as ov ereign state 
in violation of the temporary status given it at the Geneva 
talks. 
congress seemed to go alon~ with the administration in 
forgetting about re~unification. In 1954, senator Mike 
Mansfield, in speaking of the so~therll _ zone (state of Viet-
nam), talked of u. s. Aid creating, ,, ••• over a set period of 
time a self sustaining Vietnam free from further direct 
reliance on united states assistance.n20 
president Eisenhower, in his 1954 letter to Diem, 
pledged u. s. economic assistance to the state of Vietnam. 21 
Resulting aid to the state of -vietnam was -f :military and 
3/4 economic. 22 
1 9:F,~~eld, The Diplomacy of southeast Asia, p. 305o 
20Mccarthy, Joseph E., ' Illusion. of power in Vietnam. 
Carlton press, New york, 196'7. p. '71. 
·
21Ashrilore, Harry s. and · B~ggs, William c., .MiSsion to 
Hanoi., G. p. putnam•s sons, New york, 1961. p. 230. 
~ . ' :"' ,. ' 
22Larson, non .,}t •. .., and:r:-Arthur,, vietnam ·and Beyond· 
Rule . of Law Research center,. Duke university, Durham, N. C ~, 
1965. 
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It is to be remembered that the Geneva accords 
expressly forbid the introduction of, "all kinds of arms 
and munitions." 
In the summer of 1955, HO Chi Minh attempted 'to open 
the promised consultations on the elections of 1956. Diem 
refused. on JUly 16, 1955, Diem stated, 1~We have not 
signed .the Geneva Agreements, we are not bound in any way 
by these agreements, signed against the will of the Viet-
namese people." 23 Theunited states supported Diem in 
this matter. The u. s. position was summed up by Assist-
ant secretary of state, walters. Robertson,on .rune 1, 1956, 
"we believein free elections, and we support president 
Diem fully in his position that if elections are held, there 
.first must be conditions which preclude intimidation or 
'. 
coercion of the electorate.«24 This statement seems espe-
cially inappropriate if the conduct and results of the 1955 1 
state of Vietnam referendum are considered. 
In was :. '~;he r,p:uench>who ,. shoul.d>have ·. guaranteed~ ·the. exe-. t 
cution of the elections in 1956. on March 30, 1956, however• 
The state of Vietnam and France had reached agreement. on the 
timetable for the complete withdrawal of the French Exped-
23McTurnan and Lewis, The united states i!l Vietnam., 
p. 81. 
24 Fifeld, The Diplomacy of southeast Asia •. • p. 302o 
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1 tionary corps. The French Ntili tary Mission itself came to 
an end on May 31, 195'1'. Long before this however the prench 
had turned over authority in the southern zone to Diem 
backed by the u. s. 
The Geneva accords specifically state that the suc-
cessors to either . the French or The viet M'inh, were . obligated 
25 to carry out the provisions of the Treaty. As successor, 
in authority, to the French, Diem was legally bound to abide 
. . . 
by the accords or to turn the government back over to the 
French. He took a third course, he disavowed certain sec-
tions of the treaty, as they applied to the state of viet-
nam.26 or the three, "'big"' free world .powers, only the 
united states supported Diem's actions. Both France and 
Great Britain refused to endorse his actions. 
In two years, the united states had moved from a position 
of tacit approval for a separate state of vietnam, by arming 
it, including it in the s. E. A· T. o. Treaty, both in vio-
lation of the Geneva accords and aiding it economically, to 
a position of out right recognition of the state, as a sov-
ereign netion, by supporting Diem's refusal to honor the 
Geneva elections provisions. 
The action of those two years are interesting when they 
are compared with statements made later .bY u. s. officials 
25cmd. 9239, Miscellaneous. 
2~tcTurnan and Lewis, The united states in Vietnam. 
p. 82. 
16 
In his 1966 state of The union message, Lyndon Jognson said,. 
nwe stand by the aeneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962." In 
that same speech, Jognson stated: 
"Not - to ~~any years ago -vietnam was a peace-
ful, lf troubled, land. Iti the north was an 
independent communist government. In the 
south, a people struggled to build a nation 
with the friendly help of the united states • 
•••• Then ••• North vietnam decided on conquest.27 
u.s. News and world 'Report, reported in April of 1965, that 
the u. s. ~overnment was ready to discuss a settlement in 
V1·etn~, if the communists would agree to respect the 1954 
Geneva Agreements, ;,·_;hich they signed, and let south Vietnam 
alone. 28 In 1966, Deputy under secretary for political 
Affairs, u. Alexis Jo@;nso~ declared z :~ 
' . 
"It is a travesty on the truth to allege that 
the present situation ·wa:s bro'l,lght a:b·out by 
the failure of the south to carry ·out the 1954 
a ceo rds. In fact, it was the North tha. t was 
not willing to submit itself to the test of 
free elections under international control. 11 29 
A state Department White paper in 1961 stated: 
"It was the communists calculation that 
nationwide ele·ctions s chedtiled in the 
accords for 1956 would . turn all of south 
Vietnam over to them •••• The· authorities 
27Draper, Abuse of power, p. 90. 
2B.. ' I • 'l r - ·::.::~ 
- \Jl•'· :fl- ~· :N~w,s .~.an~u.~world :Report., April 5, 1965 p. 64. 
29
nepartment of state Bulletin, April 4, 1966, 
p. 530. 
17 
refused to fall into this well laid trap.n30 
Ih 1964, in an address on the campus of syracuse university, 
t .'f,tndon Johpson used the unilateral declaration on Geneva, 
by the u. s., in 1954, as ~a justificatio~ for our inter-
vention 1;1::n:; Vietnam. He accused, in fact 1 North vietnam 
• r• • • 
of vic::>~ating tll.e . ac_cords first. He did the same in anothet-
section of that same speech: 
"In 1954 1 that Government (North Vietnam) <~ .t: .. \_, · :: 
pledged - th~t l~ would, "~esp~6t th~ ter-
ritory under the military control of the 
other party and engage in no hostile acts 
against the other party. tt31 
There is, in fa~t, little indication that the North 
.. . -
Vietnamese had violated this provision s.ubstantially until 
well after the election date, summer 1956, had passed. 
secretary of state William ·Rogers stated, on M·arch 27 1 
1969: 
"Basically, and as essential elements in an 
ultimate settlement, w~ envisage: 
Restoration of the provisional military 
demarcation line at the 17th parallel, with 
reunification to be resolved in the future by 
the free decision of the · peo~le of North 
Vietman and south vietnam."3 
· 30nepartment of state publication 7308 1 released 
December, 1961. 
31New york Times, New york, August _6, 1964 1 p. 7. 
32Hearings before committee on Foreign Relations 
united states senate, Til'inety-first congress, first session, 
March 27, 1969, y4 •. f76/2:R63. 
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As the_ information, events and statements of the last 
few pages are ~ecounted, it is hard to find a solid and all 
encompassing u. s. poltcy stri.ctly adhering· to the Geneva 
accords of 1954. It neither supports them nor direetly 
oppose them. They have been violated when it was con-
venient and adhered to when it was expedient to do so. 
In fact the Geneva accords appear to have had little effect 
at · all in restraining this powerful nation•s vietnam policy. 
The united states has used the s. E. A· T. o. treaty 
a~ .being a solid commitment to commit .American forces to the 
Vietnam conflict. In justifying u. s. policy there, the 
I 
Johnson adminispration, under which our involvement has 
mushroomed, has used the s. E. A. T. o. pact along with 
president Eisenhower•s letter to Diem in october of 1954 
and president Kennedyts letter of December 14, 1961, as 
promises to automatically send troops and arms.33 
The latter two items are the easiest to dispense with. 
on April 20, 1964, Lyndon Johp.son said, in N~w york, " •••• 
In the case of Vietnam, our commitment today is just the same 
as the commitment made by president Eisenhower in 1954.u34 
rn 1966, he said, 11 ()ur men in vietnam are there: to keep 
a promise that was made 12 years ago.u35 In a news con-
·.J · 33braper, ·Abuse of power., p. 156. 
34 Lawson, vietnam and Beyond, p. 106-7. 
35Ashmore and Baggs, Mission TO Hanoi., p. -251. 
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ference in JUne of 1964, he stated: 
·"tn the case of Vietnam, our commitment 
today 'is just the same as the commit-
ment made by president Eisenhower to 
president Diem · ln 1954, a commitment to 
help these people help themselves."36 
Finally, in 1965, the president said, "Ten· y~ars ago we 
pledged our help. Three presidents have supported that 
pledge. we will not break it."37 At Jdhns Hopkins univ-
ersity, Johnson stated, "we are there because we have a 
promise to keep. since 1954 every Ameri~an pr~sident has 
offered support to the people of south Vietnam.n38 
What was this 1' commitment," of the Eisenhower letter. 
The letter, made no mention of military aid, it was a con-
ditional offer of economic assistance: 
"we have been exploring ways and means 'to 
permit our aid to vietnam to be more effec-
tive •••• ! am accordingly, instructing -the 
American ambassador to Vietnam to examine 
with you ••• how · an intelligent program of 
American aid •••• can serve to assist Viet-
nam •••• rt hopes that such aid, combined with 
.your own continuing efforts' will contri-
bute effectively toward an independent viet-
nam, endowed with a strong government.n39 
36nepartment of state Bulletin, JUne 22, 1964 • 
. 3'7L!irson, Vietnam and B6yon~. 1 state of the Union 
Message. 
38N"ew york ·Times, New york, "Lyndon Jol:lnson at Johhs 
Hopkins trniversity,tt 
39Larso.n, Vietnam and :Beyond, p. 100. 
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Although s.ome milit~ry aid, arms and munitions, fol-
lowed the letter, there. is no mention _ of any type of mili-
tary commitment towards south vietnam. rn fact, in August 
of 1965, former president Eisenhower maintained that the 
letter was not· :a ·:cothmitment by the u. s. to military inter-
ven.t"a·on~:· : .. '"We were. talking, at that time, not in terms of 
military support •••• we were talking about economic aid what 
we call foreign aid •••• ·tr 40 This would seem to insubstan-
tiate s~ggestions that the Eisenhower letter committed the 
u. s. to miiitary intervention. 
The Kennedy letter is less often sighted as estab-
lishing a commitment. In that letter Kennedy informed 
Diem that the united states, in response to his request, 
intended to, "promptly increase our assistance to your (Diem•s) 
defense effort."41 tater statements by Kennedy would seem 
to indicate that he too was unwilling to make a solid com-
mitment, in the form of substantial numbers of men, "•••• 
they are the ones to win it (the war) or lose it," we could 
only send, "our men o_ut there as advisors. u 42 
. 
4% ~ S. ·News an:d world . Report~, U. S. News and '~Torld Report 
Inc., washington D· c., August 1'7, 1965, p. 15 
4lnraper, Abuse of power., p. 159. 
42 . ibid. :· 
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With Kennedyts limited military aid to South Viet-
nam, it is doubtful that his letter can be construed to 
I 
bind· the u. s. to large scale military aid. 
It seems doubtful that either letter, Eisenhowerts in 
1954 or Kennedyts in 1961 is substantial evidence of a 
long lasting legal u. s. military co~nitment to south 
Vietnrun. 
The s. R. A. T. o. treaty or Southeast Asia Col-
. . 
lective Defense Treaty has also been the basis of the 
United states• action in Vietnam. rt has been used by 
presidents JO~nson and Nixon in justifying our major role 
in the Indo China war. 43 
In August of 1964, president Johnson, ·:. in· recounting 
the u. s. commitments in vietnam stated that in september 
of 1954, the u. s. Signed the Manila, s. E. A. T· o. pa'ct , 
recognizing that aggression in south Vietnam would endanger the 
peace and safety of other nations and he insisted that the 
treaty boufld"l the u. s. to military aid in south vietnam. 44 
This paper has already discussed the questionable legal 
basis, in relation to .Gez:eva, ?f ~nclud~ng south vie~nam in 
the protocol of the s. E. A· T. o. pact. This paper has also 
43ibid., p. 156. 
,. 
44 Larson, Vietnam and Beyond, p. 107 
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recounted, briefly the _ origin -:>f the ~·- E. A. _ T._ o. treaty. 
The treaty, as has been stated, was aimed at correcting 
the imbalance between the communist and free natiqns, 
created by the French defeat in Indo China. Its primary 
purpose was to prevent _the rest of Indo China from fal-
ling to the communists. 
The major obligations under the treaty are expressed 
in Article IV; sections 1 and 2: 
"1. Each party recognizes that agression by 
means .of armed attack in the treaty area 
against any of the parties or against any 
state or territory which the parties by 
unanimous consent may here after desig-
nate, would endanger its own peace arid 
safety, ••• and agrees to meet the common 
danger ·under its own constitutional pro-
cesses." 
'"2. If, in the opinion of any of the parties,· 
the inviolability or the integrity of the 
territory or the sovereignty or political 
independence of any party in the treaty 
area~ ••• is threatened in ariy way other than 
by ·armed attack or is affected or threat-
ened by any fact or situation which might 
endanger the peace of the area, the parties 
shall consult immediately in order to 
agree on the measures which sh~$1 be 
taken for the common defenae. 11 
These two provisions describe, 1.) Korea type, actual 
invasion and 2.) Indo China type, subversion. secretary 
of state Dulles described the first type as, "' •••• open 
45oraper, Abuse of power., p. 157. 
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military aggression by the Chinese communist regime." The 
second he referred to as, "disturbances fermented from com-
munist China.~46 The latter type would fit the Vietnam 
conflict, at least in its earlier stages of the early and 
mid 1960•s. 
It is still unclear, if the accords, in a legal sense 
apply to those Brotocol states, south Vietnam, taos and cam-
bodia, as they ~id not sign the agreemen~s. A communique 
issued during the Manila conference in 1955, indicated that 
- . .. 
,} 
only the signees would be defended actively, with only assist-
ance, hopefully given, to the protocol area.4~ The le~al 
grounds for the s. E. A· T. o. treaty to include Indo China 
. in the p.potocol is highly questionalble. AS walter Lipp-
man states, "'This was the first instance of an international 
treaty legally interfering in the internal affairs of non 
signatory. tt'48 
The question remains; Did the s. E. A· T. o. treaty 
obligate the united states and the other signitories to 
take the military action which has been taken? statements 
by several authorities would indicate that it does not. 
~6Larson, Vietnam and Beyond., p. 102 
47:New york Titnes, New york, January 22, 195~, p. 1. 
48Mccarthy, :tllusion ·of power in Vietnam, p. 49. 
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In testifying before th senate Foreign ·nelat ions com-
mittee in November of 1954, Dulles declared: 
11The treatydoes not attempt tq get into the ' dif-
ficult question as to how precisely we act •••• 
Article LV, paragraph 2, contemplates that if 
the sutuation (of subversion) arl.ses or threa-
tens, · that we ,should co.nsult together immed-
iately in order to agree on measures which 
should bEf taken. That · is an obligation for 
consulta4~on. It is not an obli.gation for 
· action." 
Dulles later stated,, '"if there is a revolutionary move-
ment in Vietnam or in Thailand, we .would consult together 
as to what to do about it, •••• But we have no undertaking 
to put it down; all we have is an undertaking to consult 
together as to what to do about it.u50 
The senate Foreign Relations committee, in ratifying 
the treaty said: 
«Netther obligations (article IV, sections 1 and 2) 
is an automatic commitment to warfare by the 
-gnited~-states :. tni· an:y5 and·, Ja.ll ·· ci:u·cums tances of 
Asian troubles. 
The understanding is general bet~een the 
administration and congress that, if fighting 
broke out, congress would be consul~id before 
the united states became involved." 
49u .• ·j.s-. ··senate:; .t'J.'.ne . southeas·.t ' Asia · ·coll.ecti ve Defense 
Treaty, 83rd · eongress, 2nd session, Government Printing · 
Office; 1954. 
5
'1Huti, B. S~ N., vietnam Divided., Bombay Chronicle 
press, Bombay, 1964, p. 4'1, 
51New york Ti~, New york, January 22, 1955., p. 1. 
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In an editorial on January 13, 1955, The New york Times 
stated: 
"It (the treaty) is riot automatic in it appli-
cation. It does, however, pledge tne signa-
tory powers to immediate consultation, ••• and 
to take required actions within the limit~­
tions of their constitutional processes.• 2 
In a debate on the senate .floor, senator George, 
Chairman of the Foreign Relations committee, declared, that 
the u. s. couldn't go to war under the treaty without the 
sanction of congress. senator smith observed that there was 
no intention to commit United states ground forces in any 
hostilities in the treaty area. 
The House ·Republican committee on planning and Research 
state'!-, "Article IV of the southeast Asia C~llective Defense 
Treaty •••• does not commit,in advance, any signatory to use 
its armed forces to deal with the aggressor."53 
Henry cabot Lodge, former ambassador to south Viet-
J;lam, stated in 1965: 
•rt is a fact that the actions we a~e taking 
in Vietnam is not under the aegis of the trnited 
Nations or 4he southeast Asia Treaty organiz-
ation •••• n5 
All of these statements are in harsh contrast to that 
52New YorkT·inies., editorial, J.anuarJT ?3, 1955;.IV 12~ 
53House ·Republican committee on planning and ·Research, 
"Vietnam: some neglected A,apects of the Historical 'Record." 
- .. . . ,. .. ,. ~ 
54u~ s. News and Wibrld Repo~t, February 15, 1965, l·'P• 64. 
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of secretary of state Dean ~sk, on January 28, 1966, when 
he was asked by senator J. w. Fulbright, whether or not the 
treaty committed us to action in vietnam, he replied: 1'yes 
Sin, I have no doubt that it does."' 
The s. E. A· T· o. treaty called for consultations, 
these meetings did take place, notably on qcto,ber :1, ··~19iG1, 
April 8 to 10, 1963 and April 13 and 14, 1964. No concrete 
proposals were adopted at these meetings. None of the other 
signatories have seen fit , to support our action in Vietnam 
or significantly act on their own. since they have not 
acknowledged the necessity of action in Vietnam; we would 
seem to have little grounds for acting, on our own, under 
55 the s. E. A· T· o. ~re~ty. 
The s. E. A· T. o. pact was meant to be a multilateral 
defensive pact. There seems to be little basis for unilat-
eral action. 
MY contention that the trea~y does not form a legal 
committment, rests on two factors. 1g It is questionable 
whether the inclusion of south Vietnam in its protocol is 
valid, in light of the Geneva accords, and 2) ~o specific 
. ' ' 
arrangements can be_ found in the treaty-, which bin~ any 
signatory to unilateral action. This latter view is 
supported by statements of John Foster Dulles, the de:si)gner 
of the treaty. 
55Larson, Vietnam and Beyond., p. 105. 
27 
It is dif~ic':llt _ te _ 'disce_r.n a c~ear cut Ame~ican policy 
regarding s • . E. A. T· o. and Geneva. C0ntributing to this 
confusion has been the .changing line of' the official gov-
e~nment description of the war•s origin and its history. 
A prime example of this ambiguity can be found in the com-
parison of two documents, The state Department White paper 
on Vietnam, issued in 1961 and The White paper on the s~e 
subject released in 1965. 
The 1961 version still describes Vietnam as one nation, 
''•• .divided ••• one-half provides a safe sanctuary from which 
subversion in the other half is directed." No mention of 
direct aggression is made. The document further states 
· that, ,.,The basic pattern of Viet cong activity is not new, 
' 
of course •••• most of the same methods were used in Malaya, 
56 In Greece and in The Philippines. rJ BY 1965, the position 
of the government had changed. rn the 1965 White paper, 
the subversion in the south had changed to aggression, ·"south ~ 
Vietnam 1 is fighting for its life against a brutal campaign 
of terror and armed attack •••• This aggression has been 
going on for years •••• " 
The White paper f .urther states 1 '<t'The war in Vietnam is 
a new kind of war •••• ~ ~totally new brand of aggression.n 
The divided nation had changed into two separate states: 
56From Department of state publication, 7308, released 
D• cember, 1961. 
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-• ••• In vietnam, a communist government has 
set out deliberately -to conquer a sover-
eign people in a neighboring state.n5'7 
The .Pc,.~r.,:. supports its charges of aggression with statistics 
on the flow of arms and munitions from the North to the south. 
on April 20, 1964, Lyndon Jo~nson said, that to fail 
to respond to the need to' defeat the com~1nists in the ~ area 
(Vietnam), 11would reflect on our honor as a nation, (and) 
would undermine world-wide confidence in our (cause).•58 
our policies in Vietnam during the mid and late 1950's and 
the early 1960ts, seems have followed this thinking. The 
u. s. was determined to stop communist expansion at the 
17th parallel. It did not allow the Geneva accords or 
s. E. A• T. o. limitations block that objective. It is 
probable that at its inception, our policy was influenced 
primarily by the concept of a International communist 
Conspiracy. As Dr. Irving Greenberg testified before the 
senate Foreign Relations Committee: 
"Even opponents of the war would do well to 
recreate the moral climate of the early days 
of our intervention •••• There was a phase in 
-which we saw communist China as expansionist 
and North Vietnam as purely a Chinese sat-
ellite. - rn th,i.s phase the fear of another 
57From Department of state publication, '7834, released 
February, ~965 • 
..... \ ::".,; ' • •• • •• ~ -· ' . -;-: :>. .-' ... 
58L~rson, Vietnam and Beyond, P• 10'7. 
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MUnich and the conviction that we dare 
not sell out or be indifferent ••• colored 
the judgement of many. But ·when •••• events 
and facts and growing knowledge of Viet-
nam reve.aled the falsity of our assump-
tions ••• we should have admitted (it) ••• 
This inability to admit error •••• has 
driven us deeper and deeper into the mire.~59 
It is probable that the legal technicalities of the 
two documents, had little influence on American policy, 
except where it was useful. It is hard to say whether the 
united states was wrong in this. cerainly history if full 
of violations of trusts and treaties of all types. cer-
tainly, the communists in Vietnam are not guiltless. This 
paper has not dealt with Communist violatio~s of the Geneva · 
wa.-e. 
accords. Therevmany. certainly their reluctance to make 
France carry out the treaty agreements is not to their 
credit. certainly both· s;ides can be bl~ed-}f.or not 
using diplomacy before it- was too late to alter their re;:s·-
pective courses of action. 
My reaction to the facts, events and statements recounted 
in this paper, is not one of blame for our government. 
It is one of disappointment. surely, it is not in the spirit 
of our heritage and in keeping with our ideals, that we 
p~ayed so prominent a role in destroying the effectiveness 
of the Geneva accords. It is hardly in keeping with the 
concepts · of honesty and national integrity, that we have 
59Hearings Before the committee on Foreign Relations, 
united states Senate, May 7, 1970., p. 11, Y4 F ~6/2: As 4/12. 
30 
used the s. E• A• Te o.. agreement and other documents as the 
basis for our intervention in Vietnam. 
The inability of the United states to change its course 
of action in the face of changing circumstances~ is surely 
one of the greatest weaknesses in our policies toward vietnam 
and Indo China. 
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